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12.1  Introduction 
This paper presents and utilizes a new general equilibrium simulation 
model of  capital income taxation. Its chief advantage over existing mod- 
els of  taxation is that it recognizes that agents may adjust their financial 
behavior in response to changes in the way that capital income is taxed. 
The model can trace the general equilibrium impact of  these financial 
adjustments and calculate the tax-induced changes in the allocation of 
factors and production  as well as the distributional effects of  any tax 
change. 
The paper is organized as  follows. Section 12.2 provides as background 
a brief review of the important antecedent literature. In section 12.3, I 
describe the structure of the model, while in section 12.4, the parameter- 
ization and control solution of  the model are detailed. Section 12.5 uses 
the model to simulate the general equilibrium  impact of  changing the 
present  system of  taxing capital income under inflation  to a perfectly 
indexed tax system. Some concluding remarks are made in section 12.6. 
12.2  Review of the Literature 
General equilibrium analysis of  the effects of  taxation began with the 
static, two-sector, two-factors-of-production  model of Harberger (1959, 
1962,  1966).'  In  the original  version  of  the model,  two  competitive 
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industries employ two factors which are perfectly mobile between the 
sectors, but are fixed in total supply; the factors are  paid a return which, 
including taxes paid, is equal to their respective marginal products. All 
consumers (and the government by implication) have identical homo- 
thetic preference functions as to the two goods. This formulation allows 
one to account directly for the interdependence among all product and 
factor markets.* 
The Harberger model is especially suited for the analysis of differential 
taxation of  either final outputs or factors. The effect of a differential tax 
on factor returns and the commodity price ratio is shown to depend on the 
relative factor intensity of production in the two sectors, the substitutabil- 
ity of  factors in production, and the extent of demand substitutability. If 
all  consumers and the government do not have identical  homothetic 
preference functions, then any shifting of  income among these groups 
would also have repercussions for relative prices since the composition of 
aggregate demand would change. The personal incidence of a differential 
tax  depends on the personal  distribution  of  factor endowments and 
consumption preferences. If  all individuals have identical factor endow- 
ments, then any changes in factor returns have no income distributional 
effect from the sources of income side. If  consumption preferences do  not 
vary, then relative price variations do  not have any distributional implica- 
tions from the uses of  income side. 
Harberger’s methodology was to solve the general equilibrium system 
analytically, making the problem tractable by assuming linearity or using 
a local approximation, and by limiting the dimensions of  the problem. 
Shoven and Whalley  (1972)  showed  that such a  general  equilibrium 
system  could  be  solved  explicitly  without  simplifications,  using  an 
appropriate solution algorithm. A variety of functional forms for produc- 
tion  and demand functions could then be specified. The comparative 
static effects of a tax change are found by simply comparing the pre- and 
postchange equilibria. The flexibility of  this method of solution allowed 
Shoven and Whalley to disaggregate the general equilibrium model more 
extensively than had been previously attempted. Disaggregation of  pro- 
duction allows a more detailed calculation of the intersectoral misalloca- 
tion  caused  by,  for example, differential  factor tax application. Dis- 
aggregation of consumer groups permits a detailed assessment of changes 
in the personal distribution of  income. 
In the most  recent  use  of  this technique,  sixteen  consumer goods 
(counting savings as one such good)  are distinguished.  Using  input- 
output information, a vector of  consumer goods is translated into a vector 
of  nineteen produced goods, which in turn are produced by  labor and 
capital. Twelve consumer classes are distinguished on the basis of differ- 
2.  For a discussion of the relative merits of  general versus partial equilibrium analyses of 
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ing marginal personal tax rates, factor endowments, and consumption 
preferences. Although it is larger, the Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley3  model 
has the same basic structure as the simple Harberger model. 
Some recent research, though, has focused on a number of  potentially 
important aspects of the capital income tax environment which are out- 
side the scope of  a Harberger-type model. For example, one characteris- 
tic of the Harberger-type models is that in an equilibrium situation all 
individuals face the same relative rates of  tax on capital placed in the 
various sectors. The pattern of marginal products of  capital is such that 
the after-tax rates of  return on capital in all sectors are equal for all 
individuals; each individual can be thought of  as owning a proportionate 
share of  all the economy’s capital goods. Note that this kind of  equilib- 
rium would be impossible if  the relative rates of  tax on capital goods 
differed for different individuals. Feldstein and Slemrod (1980) point out 
that this  is in  fact  the case  in  the United  States, where there is  (i) 
progressive personal taxation with marginal rates ranging from below the 
corporate rate to above the corporate rate, and (ii) the opportunity to 
substantially reduce personal taxation through corporate retained earn- 
ings. In this situation corporate-source  capital income may be taxed more 
or less heavily than noncorporate capital income depending on one’s tax 
bracket. If  corporate equity and other capital income sources were per- 
fect  substitutes for other than tax  reasons,  then we would  expect to 
observe that in equilibrium any individual would invest entirely in corpo- 
rate equity  or entirely  in  the alternative  asset,  but never  both; this 
specialization will occur whenever the relative tax on two types of invest- 
ment differs for different  groups.  In order to explain  the observed 
tendency for investors to hold diversified portfolios, an explicit portfolio 
balance relation is required. 
Ideally, a model should specify the sources of  risk in the economy, 
individuals’ attitude toward risk bearing (expressed in the form of cardi- 
nal utility functions), and the opportunities for portfolio diversification. 
In such a model, portfolios will differ by consumer class. Therefore, for 
certain problems it may be incorrect to assume that all capital owners 
bear the burden of  tax changes identically. 
The work of  Stiglitz (1973) and King (1974), building on the classic 
paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958), made clear that any analysis of 
corporation taxation must consider the financial flexibility that corpora- 
tions have. Interest paid on debt is deductible from corporate taxable 
income, and dividends are taxed differently than retained earnings so that 
the effective tax on equity earnings depends on the capital structure and 
the payout policy  of  the corporation. When  Harberger and Shoven- 
Whalley  calculate  the total effective  tax  on corporate-source  capital 
income, they consider the financial structure of the sector, but when the 
3. The later versions of  the model are the work of  Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley. 430  Joel Slemrod 
effects of a tax change are simulated, financial policy is assumed to be 
unaffected.4 Papers by  Ballentine  and McLure (1978) and Feldstein, 
Green, and Sheshinski (1979) have investigated the effects of  corporation 
income tax in a world of  flexible corporate financial policy, but neither 
posed  the question in  a general equilibrium model with  differentially 
taxed wealth owners and several production sectors. 
This concludes the overview of the important antecedent literature. 
The  research since Harberger may, it seems, be divided into two catego- 
ries. The first category features highly stylized, usually partial equilib- 
rium, models that focus on one aspect of capital income taxation, such as 
the implications of  a progressive  tax system or the role of  corporate 
financial decisions. In the second category is the work of  Shoven and his 
collaborators,  where a large general  equilibrium model is constructed as a 
framework for the analysis of  a wide range of  taxation issues. However, 
the Shoven model, being fundamentally identical to the smaller Harber- 
ger model, inadequately treats several of  the important issues raised in 
the first group of papers. The remainder of  this paper is devoted to the 
development of  a new model which is general equilibrium in the tradition 
of  the second category of  research, but can also offer insight  into the 
issues raised by the first categroy of  the recent literature. 
12.3  Description of the Model 
12.3.1  Distinguishing Characteristics 
In this section, the structure of  the general equilibrium model with 
financial behavior (to be referred to hereafter as GEFB) is presented. 
Before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of  its features, its dis- 
tinguishing characteristics are briefly noted here. 
1. Explicit treatment of  riskiness. Income from capital is not certain, 
and individuals are risk-averse. Individuals allocate their wealth among 
the available asset types on the basis of optimal portfolio considerations. 
2.  Portfolio choice under progressive taxation. Since different agents 
face different  tax rates, they  will  hold different portfolios.’ Thus, for 
incidence results, it is not generally true that all capital owners will be 
identically affected to the extent that they own capital. 
3. Endogenous tax rates. An individual’s marginal tax rate is not fixed, 
but rather depends on the amount of his or her taxable income. This is an 
important consideration in the decision of how much financial leverage to 
4. In Fullerton, King, Shoven, and Whalley (1979),  corporations can adjust their di- 
vidend policy in environments where dividends get preferential tax treatment, but only the 
extreme alternative of  100% payout is considered. 
5. Compare  this to the result of  standard general equilibrium models that all individuals 
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acquire, since  the marginal  tax saving from  borrowing  declines  with 
greater borrowing in a progressive tax system. 
4. Tax-exempt  bonds. These securities are a potentially significant 
outlet for the wealth of  high-tax-bracket individuals and are included in 
the available asset menu. 
5. Rental and owned housing. The capital income from these two ways 
of  consuming housing are subject to very different taxation schemes. In 
this model the two types of housing are treated separately. 
6. Corporate financial policy. The importance of the ability to alter 
corporate financial  decisions in  response  to the tax environment has 
already been noted. The GEFB model can accommodate endogenous 
corporate decisions in a number of  ways. 
12.3.2  Risk, Risk Aversion, and Portfolio Choice 
Each agent in the economy is endowed with a fixed amount of  capital 
goods and a fixed amount of labor in efficiency units. The capital goods 
may be used in the production of goods for sale or in the production of 
housing services to be consumed by  the owner. Labor is inelastically 
supplied to firms in return for a wage. 
The production  functions  of  all  goods  other than  owner-occupied 
housing are stochastic. The stochastic element, though, refers only to  the 
contribution to production of the capital input; thus the marginal product 
of labor is certain." 
In the standard Harberger model, the individual  implicitly  faces a 
two-stage decision process. In the first stage, his endowment of factors is 
allocated  in  order to maximize  the flow of  income or, equivalently, 
wealth at some point  in time. In the second stage, the income flow is 
allocated among consumption goods in order to maximize utility. In the 
GEFB model, a similar but modified two-stage decision process is en- 
visioned. In the first stage, the individual constructs a portfolio to maxi- 
mize the expected utility of  the stream of  income or, equivalently, the 
expected utility of some future period's wealth. Once the uncertainty is 
resolved and actual income is revealed, the income is allocated among 
consumption goods to maximize the utility obtained. 
The following special form of  the first-stage maximand  will be con- 
sidered: 
where 7 is the expected flow of after-tax income, p is a trade-off coef- 
ficient, V is the variance of  after-tax income, and K is the capital endow- 
ment. This formulation has the desirable feature that the portfolio de- 
6. An  example of  such a production function is Q = KYL1  -Y + OK,  where 0 is stochastic. 432  Joel Slemrod 
mand functions implied by its maximization are identical to the optimal 
rules for an individual who has only capital income and is faced with a 
frictionless capital market and an infinitesimal planning horizon.’ 
In the second stage, realized income is allocated among the consump- 
tion goods, Since only homothetic utility functions are considered, max- 
imizing the expected utility of income in the first stage also maximizes the 
expected utility of  consumption. 
12.3.3  Model Structure 
In this section, the overall structure ofthe model will be laid out. In 
subsequent sections,  more detailed  attention will  be  paid  to certain 
sectors of  the model and their parameterization. 
The economy’s agents are considered to consist of  nine stylized types, 
each representing a  different  income class.  The agents vary in  their 
(fixed) endowment of  capital and labor as well as their preferences for 
consumption goods. All individuals are assumed to have the same coef- 
ficient of risk aversion. Because there is a progressive tax system, the 
different categories of  individuals,  called “income groups” for conve- 
nience, will have different marginal tax rates and the after-tax riskiness of 
assets will also differ among individuals. 
The model has production  functions for each of  four goods: food, 
rental housing, owner-occupied housing, and a composite good produced 
by corporations. Each income class has a demand function for each good, 
which  depends on real income, relative prices, and the tastes of  the 
income group. 
There are asset demand functions of  each class for each of six assets: 
food-sector capital, rental housing, owner-occupied housing, corporate 
equity, taxable debt, which is assumed to be riskless, and tax-exempt 
debt, which has some uncertainty of  return. These functions are derived 
from the first-order conditions for the maximization of  expected utility, 
and include as arguments the capital endowment, the after-tax expected 
real  rate of  returns  on  the  available  assets,  the  after-tax  variance- 
covariance structure, and the degree of risk aversion. The tax system is 
assumed  to regard net  losses  symmetrically  with  net gains,  and the 
marginal  tax  rate is  assumed  constant  in  the calculation  of  after-tax 
variances and covariances. 
There are market-clearing equations for all assets and all goods. The 
supply equations of  different assets have different characteristics. For 
housing  and food-sector capital,  the supply simply equals the capital 
stock used in production. For corporate equity, asset supply is the equity- 
7.  In the case of  a portfolio choice between one risky and one riskless asset, the demand 
for the risky asset is given by KE  = K(rE -  rB)/2pVE,  where E refers to the risky asset and p 
to the riskless asset. The coefficient p is proportional to Pratt’s measure of  relative risk 
aversion. The generalization to many assets is  straightforward. See  Friend and Blume 
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capital ratio, which is endogenous, multiplied by  the corporate capital 
stock. The supply of  tax-exempt debt is fixed by state and local govern- 
ments, and is exogenous to the model. The supply of taxable debt is the 
sum of the exogenously given supply of  federal government debt and the 
amount of  corporate debt, which is equal to the corporate debt-capital 
ratio times the corporate capital stock. Since both the debt-capital ratio 
and the corporate capital stock may be endogenous, the total supply of 
taxable debt also may be endogenous. The market-clearing equations for 
goods simply state that demand equals production. 
The model also includes equations  for the allocation of  labor to sectors 
(equalization of marginal revenue product), factor supply identities, and 
determination of  real  income and taxable  income  by  income group. 
There is also a corporate earnings exhaustion equation, which ensures 
that total corporate earnings net of  corporation income tax accrue either 
to corporate debtholders or to equityholders. 
The basic structure of the model is thus similar to the standard general 
equilibrium model of taxation, except that the simple capital allocation 
equations are replaced by explicit portfolio demand equations and mar- 
ket-clearing equations for each of several financial assets. Other distin- 
guishing aspects of  the model are discussed further below. 
12.3.4  Endogenous Tax Rates 
The total tax liability and marginal tax rates in the various kinds of 
income are calculated by appropriately reducing the income flows of the 
group to a per-tax-return basis, calculating taxable income, and applying 
the actual pattern of  tax brackets and rates that were applicable in 1977.R 
Taxable income differs from real income in a number of significant ways. 
First of all, certain deductions and exemptions are allowed. The average 
value of all such deductions and exemptions other than for interest and 
property tax  payments  is considered  to be fixed  and is entered as a 
subtraction from income. The amount of  allowable deductions for in- 
terest and property tax paid is endogenously determined using the simu- 
lated  portfolios.’  Second, nominal  interest  received  rather than  real 
interest  received  (and paid) is included in taxable income. Third, the 
imputed income from owned housing is not included in taxable income, 
though  a small fraction of  the nominal rise in housing values due to 
inflation is included in order to reflect the partial taxation of capital gains 
on residences. Similarly, a fraction of the inflation-induced capital gains 
8. Since the discontinuous marginal tax rates of  the actual tax system cause problems for 
the solution algorithm, a smooth approximation of  the tax table is used. 
9. Of  course not all  taxpayers itemize deductions. To reflect  this  fact, the average 
exogenous deduction amount is calculated including the standard deduction for itemizers, 
and only a percentage of  property tax and interest payments are allowed as additional 
deductions. The percentage is chosen to approximate the fraction of  such payments which 
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on other assets is included."' The income from equity, after the corpora- 
tion tax, is only partially included in taxable income to reflect the fact that 
retained earnings are virtually exempt from personal taxation. The frac- 
tion included in taxable income is equal to d + (1 -  d)c,  where d is the 
payout ratio and c is the ratio of the effective tax on  capital gains to the tax 
on dividends. The value of  c will be less than one because of the exclusion 
of  one-half of long-term capital gains, the value of  the deferral of tax 
payments until realization of the gain, and the opportunity  to avoid tax by 
bequeathing appreciated stock. For present purposes the value of c is 
taken to  be 0.125. The income from state and local securities is not part of 
the taxable income. Finally, there is  an addition to individual taxable 
income (for rental housing and food-sector capital owned) and to cor- 
poration  taxable  income  (for  corporate  capital)  to reflect  the  mis- 
measurement of capital income that is due to  historical cost depreciation 
and certain inventory accounting methods. Since depreciation on  owner- 
occupied housing is not deductible from taxable income, inflation does 
not thereby cause any additional tax to be paid due to  consuming owned 
housing services. 
Once the total taxable income is determined, the marginal tax rate on a 
dollar of taxable income (call it t)  is calculated by referring to the tax 
tables. The real after-tax rate of  return earned by the ith  asset is then 
equal to  I; -  t(r;),  where 6  is the before-tax real rate of return and r; is the 
addition to taxable income from holding one dollar of  the ith  asset. For all 
the reasons mentioned above, r: may differ from I;.  For example, the 
after-tax  real  rate  of  return  to  holding  a  nominal  debt  security  is 
rB -  t(rg + T),  since a dollar of  debt yields rg + n  (the nominal interest 
rate) of  taxable income. 
12.3.5  Tax-exempt Bonds 
In the model there is a fixed supply of debt issued by  state and local 
governments, the interest  from which  is exempt from federal income 
taxation. They are presumed here to be risky assets, though they are 
significantly less risky than corporate equity, rental housing, or food- 
sector capital. 
Individuals cannot borrow at the tax-exempt interest rate; that is, they 
must  hold  a  nonnegative  quantity of  these  securities.  An  important 
question is  whether  individuals  can  simultaneously  hold  tax-exempt 
bonds and receive a tax deduction for interest paid on their outstanding 
borrowing.  The tax law states that individuals cannot borrow for the 
express purpose of  buying tax-exempt bonds and still claim the interest 
expense as a  deduction. However, it  is possible  for an individual  to 
10.  Nominal capital gains on all assets other than corporate equity are assumed to be 
equal to the rate of inflation. The real value of corporate stock also increases to the extent 
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deduct interest  payments while  at the same time holding tax-exempt 
debt. The Internal Revenue Service position is apparently that whenever 
an outstanding obligation is not directly connected with a personal or 
business loan, it will be inferred that its purpose is to carry tax-exempt 
assets, and therefore its interest  expense will  be disallowed  as a  tax 
deduction. However, the Tax Court and other courts have ruled that in 
order to  be disallowed the debt and the tax-exempt property must some- 
how be related in purpose.” 
For present  purposes  what  is needed  is an operational  rule which 
approximately captures the regulations’ effective limitation ‘on interest 
expense deductions when a portfolio includes tax-exempt  bonds.  We 
have  chosen the rule  that the IRS will  disallow  that fraction of  any 
individual’s interest deductions equal to the ratio of  the value of  tax- 
exempt bonds  to total  net  wealth.  Under this  rule, the net  cost  of 
borrowing  depends on the amount of  wealth  invested  in  tax-exempt 
bonds; also, the after-tax return of  tax-exempt bonds depends on how 
leveraged one’s portfolio is. 
12.3.6  Housing 
It is assumed that the housing sector produces housing services from 
capital with no labor input. Though the omission of labor is certainly a 
stylization of the production process, it is not an unwarranted exaggera- 
tion. Aaron (1972) notes that housing services require the combination of 
more capital per unit of  labor than does any major category of consumer 
or investment goods.  Using a detailed input-output matrix, Fullerton, 
King, Shoven, and Whalley  (1979) calculate the capital-labor ratio of 
producing housing services to be approximately twenty times higher than 
the economy-wide capital-labor ratio and fifteen times higher than any 
other major sector.’* 
It is further assumed that the services from rented housing and the 
services from owner-occupied housing are considered by consumers to be 
distinct commodities. In actuality, though their characteristics tend to 
differ, the distinction  is  not  absolute.  Which type of  housing will  be 
chosen by  a given family unit  (they may in  many  cases effectively be 
mutually exclusive commodities), and the quantity consumed given that 
choice, will depend on tastes as well as the relative price of  rented versus 
owner-occupied housing. If all the individuals within an income group are 
aggregated,  the aggregate  relative  consumption  of  the two  types  of 
11.  See Internal Revenue Service Proceedings 72-18 and James (1979). 
12. Aaron and others have pointed out that although the production of  housing services 
is capital-intensive, production of  the housing stock itself is relatively labor-intensive; of  all 
the major private sectors of  the economy, only finance and insurance had as high a fraction 
of direct labor requirements. Analysis of  this issue would require expanding the model to 
include the demand for and production of  capital goods; this looms beyond the scope of 
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housing services may be represented as a smooth function of the relative 
price of  the two goods and the distribution of  tastes within the class (see 
Rosen and Rosen 1980). 
The set of  available assets includes rented and owner-occupied hous- 
ing.  It is assumed that the production of  services from rental housing 
capital is subject to stochastic influences, and the production of  services 
from owner-occupied housing is not stochastic. In expected-value terms, 
the two production functions are identical. The model then has a market- 
clearing equation for rental housing, where the sum of the nine income 
groups’ demand for it as an asset must equal the stock necessary to supply 
the rental services demanded by consumers at the equilibrium relative 
prices. For owner-occupied housing, the situation is somewhat different. 
For each income class, there is an additional constraint that the desired 
stock must produce a flow of  services equal to the amount of  services 
demanded by that class. Thus there is  implicitly a separate market for 
each class  in  which  each individual  rents the housing  services  from 
himself. For each class, there is a shadow price of  consuming housing. 
This price  has three components: (i) the pecuniary  income foregone 
through holding capital in housing rather than another asset, (ii) the cost 
of  maintenance and depreciation, and (iii) any attendant tax liabilities or 
rebates. 
12.3.7  The Government Sector 
One function of  the government is relative price stabilization. In the 
absence of government intervention, the market-clearing pattern of rela- 
tive prices would depend on the state of the world that obtains. In this 
economy, though, the government maintains stocks of  all commodities, 
and pledges to defend a particular relative price structure by buying all 
production  at these prices and selling that amount of  each commodity 
such that these announced prices support markets that clear. The relative 
price structure that the government supports is the one that would obtain 
if realized production was equal to the expected value of  production in 
each sector. Of course which prices are supported depends on the alloca- 
tion of  capital and labor by  sector. This arrangement leads to market 
clearing with  no intervention  necessary  if  the expected  values  of  all 
sectors’ production obtain, and with some use of the government’s com- 
modity stocks possibly required if they do not. Note that by doing this the 
government does not insulate agents from the production  uncertainty, 
but rather confines the effects of the uncertainty to  incomes while making 
relative prices nonstochastic.” 
13. Two  considerations  motivate the  introduction of  this role for government. The  first is 
that in the absence of such a role, the individual must consider the covariation between asset 
returns and relative  prices in making his or her portfolio decision.  This is a significant 
complication that the assumption of  no relative  price uncertainty avoids.  Second, and 437  A General Equilibrium Model 
The government must  also collect taxes to finance its expenditure, 
which has three components. The first is spending on goods and services, 
which is fixed. The second component is interest payments, which vary 
according to  the equilibrium interest rates on government debt. The  third 
component is  the cost  of  the price  supports discussed  above. Since 
uncertain capital income constitutes part of  the tax base, total tax rev- 
enue is also uncertain.  The government constructs its tax schedules so 
that the expected  value of  its tax revenues  equals  its expenditure  commit- 
ments. Any divergence of  actual tax revenues from this expected value is 
made up by a special tax levied in proportion to  the value of each agent’s 
tax liability. 
When the economic environment changes so that expected revenues 
no longer equal desired expenditure, the government alters the tax rate 
schedules to reestablish  the equality. Thus the expected value of  the 
stochastic tax transfers will always be zero. 
12.3.8  Corporate Financial Policy 
Corporate financial policy represents another dimension of  possible 
behavioral response to changes in the tax environment. Modigliani and 
Miller  (1958)  demonstrated the  irrelevance  to firm  market value  of 
corporate financial decisions in the absence of taxes, and speculated that 
financial flexibility would allow firms to avoid any corporation income tax 
by issuing debt instead of  equity and to avoid any tax on dividends by 
retaining earnings within the corporation. Much recent work, some of 
which was referred to earlier, has reexamined the interaction between 
capital income taxation and corporate finance taking into account, among 
other things, the personal taxation of  debt interest, the effective capital 
gains tax on retained earnings, and progressive taxation. 
In Slemrod (1980)” I discuss several methods of  introducing the finan- 
cial flexibility of  corporations into a GEFB model. Because of  the lack of 
a consensus about just what characterizes a capital market equilibrium in 
the environment described  above, no simple procedure will  be com- 
pletely  satisfactory. Nevertheless,  in  that work  I  utilized a procedure 
which is in the spirit of several theoretical treatments of corporate finan- 
cial behavior in the presence of taxes and is consistent with the econome- 
tric evidence concerning financial policy behavior. I will briefly describe 
related, in the presence of price uncertainty there is some ambiguity about how “risky” an 
asset is. As Stiglitz (1969) has pointed out. even if the real output from an investment were 
perfectly certain, fluctuations in outputs of  other commodities would still make the given 
investment risky, since both its relative price and the marginal utility of income would vary. 
Under certain conditions a sector with no technological uncertainty may experience greater 
uncertainty in return than an industry which does have a stochastic production function. 
Assuming no price uncertainty avoids this ambiguity. 
14.  See pp. 69-97  for a more detailed treatment of  the issues raised in this section and for 
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in turn the procedure, its theoretical justification, and the relevant econ- 
ometric evidence. 
The suggested procedure is to set both important corporate financial 
decisions (debt-equity and payout) to be functions of critical “tax cost” 
values. Behind this procedure is a theory which envisions the corporation 
maximizing its value by balancing the net tax advantages of  its financial 
structure with the other costs and benefits of  the policy. For debt-equity 
policy,  the costs that offset  the tax  advantages  of  debt may  be real 
bankruptcy costs or  agency costs. For dividend policy, the tax advantages 
of  retained earnings must be balanced against the transactions cost of 
receiving  income in  the form  of  capital gains, the signaling value  of 
dividends, constraints on firm growth, and the law which inhibits the 
unwarrranted accumulation of  funds within the corporation. 
One common element of these nontax factors is the difficulty of  quan- 
tifying them and explicitly relating their magnitude to the financial poli- 
cies chosen. Rather thdn arbitrarily constructing such measures, I instead 
use econometrically estimated responses of  financial policy to the tax cost 
of  the policies involved. The presumption  is that these measured  re- 
sponses are the result of  an optimal balancing of  tax considerations with 
the other implications of  the financial decision. 
The estimated responsiveness of the debt-equity ratio comes from King 
(1978), where he finds an elasticity of  0.8 with respect to the tax cost 
variable t,(l -  tp)A,  where t, is the rate of  corporation income tax and 
(1 -  is a weighted average of  (one minus) the marginal tax rate of 
equityholders. This  value  measures  the  cost  of  raising  new  capital 
through debt versus new share issue. The estimated responsiveness of the 
payout ratio is taken from Slemrod (1980), where the work of  Brittain 
(1966) was updated. The estimated elasticity of  the payout ratio with 
respect to the tax cost of dividends (tu -  tRE)A  (the weighted average of 
the difference in the tax rate on dividends minus the effective tax rate on 
retained earnings) was found there to be  -0.79. 
12.4  Parameterization and the Control Solution 
12.4.1  Parameterizing the Model 
The model  is  parameterized to  represent a  stylized  United States 
economy of  the year 1977. That year is chosen because it is the most 
recent year for which detailed tax return information is available. Unfor- 
tunately, though, the best information available about certain key values 
refers to  earlier years. Thus it is often necessary to update and adjust data 
to represent the 1977 situation. 
One crucial set of values for which the best data available are severely 
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as well  as for the structure of  portfolios  by  income and wealth class 
remains the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Financial Characteristics 
of  Consumers (SFCC),  which refers to year-end  1962. The SFCC dis- 
aggregates the wealth and portfolio information into nine income classes. 
In order to obtain a wealth distribution for 1977, it is assumed here that 
the relative distribution of wealth by real income class has not changed 
since 1962. The SFCC income classes are thus inflated by  a factor of 
three, which is approximately the factor by which per capita disposable 
personal income rose between 1962 and 1977.’’  The resulting nine income 
classes for the 1977 model are as follows: $0-$9,000,  $9,000-$15,000, 
$75,000-$150,000, $150,000-$300,000, and over $300,000. The nine styl- 
ized individuals in the economy represent average individuals of each of 
these income classes. The relative distribution of  wealth among these 
classes is assumed to be the same as the relative distribution among the 
equivalent 1962 classes.I6 
Under the model’s assumptions the relative gross remuneration  of 
labor will equal the relative endowment of  labor in efficiency units. To 
approximate this distribution, I use the 1977 Statistics of home  measure 
of wages and salaries received by  taxpaying units in each income class, 
supplemented by adding one-half of  the net return to business, profes- 
sion, farm, and partnership as an approximation to the labor input share 
in self-employment.” The resulting distribution of labor is given in table 
12.A.1 of  the appendix. 
In order to obtain the value of total private wealth, the ratio of private 
wealth to labor units as of  1962 was calculated and then applied to the 
total labor endowment in 1977. That procedure yielded 4.24 billion units, 
or $4.24 billion worth, of  private wealth.’” As mentioned above, the 
$15,000-$22,500, $22,500-$30,000, $30,000-$45,000, $45,000-$75,000, 
15. The exact factor of  increase is 2.92. 
16. In Harberger’s original treatment and in the subsequent Shoven et al. papers, the 
unit of capital was defined as that amount which (in the assumed equilibrium) earned one 
dollar of  income net of all taxes. This procedure is perfectly consistent with their model that 
ignores the differential riskiness of capital, since then it is a condition of equilibrium that the 
net  return  of  each unit  of  capital  be equalized.  However,  when  risk  (and any  other) 
differences in particular forms of  capital are recognized, this procedure is no longer valid. 
For example, the quantity of  risky capital which produces a given expected net return will be 
less than the required  quantity of riskless capital. 
The long-run equilibrium condition that would be observed in a world with differential 
riskiness of capital is that each unit of  capital be valued the same. Since capital can move 
between sectors, any difference in value would be incompatible with equilibrium. Thus I 
have chosen to represent a unit of  capital as that quantity which in 1977 was valued at one 
dollar. 
17. This is an imperfect measure of  the appropriate return to labor since it does not 
include employer contributions for social insurance programs. 
18.  A more direct method of  calculating private wealth yields a similar figure. The 1977 
net stock of  fixed nonresidential capital was valued by the Bureau of  Economic Analysis at 
$1.616 billion, residential capital at $1.713 billion, and inventories at $0.506 billion, for a 
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distribution of  that wealth is determined according to the relative own- 
ership of  wealth from SFCC. The resulting wealth distribution is also 
shown in table 12.A.1 of the appendix. 
Because  the utility  function  of  each class  is  assumed to be  Cobb- 
Douglas, knowing the share of consumption that goes to each good is 
sufficient for parameterizing the function. The source for spending shares 
is the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Interview Sur- 
vey, 1972-73. The income classes delineated in the survey are inflated to 
refer to 1977." The food share is computed as the ratio of expenditure on 
food at home to current consumption expenditures; the rental housing 
share is the ratio of  expenditure on rented dwellings to current consump- 
tion expenditures. The appropriate share for owner-occupied housing 
cannot be straightforwardly obtained from the expenditure survey, since 
the true cost of this behavior is not correctly measured. To obtain the true 
cost of  owner-occupied housing, I apply a conversion factor to the re- 
ported  spending  equal  to the  ratio  of  actual  spending  to  reported 
spending.2o  The highest income bracket for which results are reported in 
the expenditure survey is $50,000 and over ($75,000 and over in  1977 
dollars). This blurs any possible distinction in the consumption prefer- 
ences of  the top three income classes. Rather than use  the reported 
expenditure shares of  the over $75,000 group for all of  the top three 
classes (and implicitly assume an income elasticity of  one in this range), 
the shares of  spending of the top three classes are found by extrapolating 
the share of  the sixth income class to higher incomes using estimated 
income elasticities.2' The resulting shares for food, rental housing, and 
owned housing, and, as a residual, the corporate good, are displayed in 
table 12.A.2  of  the appendix. 
The effective corporation income tax is calculated by  dividing 1977 
corporate profits  without  inventory valuation  or capital consumption 
adjustment into the total 1977 corporate profits tax liability; this yields a 
value of 0.41. 
was reported by the Federal Reserve Board to be $0.234 billion, while the amount held by 
private domestic nongovernment agents was $0.680 billion. 
Since the procedure for precisely calculating private wealth in our stylized model without 
financial institutions is not obvious, it must suffice to show that a synthetic calculation using 
these figures will yield a number not far from the $4.24 billion used in the model. 
19. The brackets used in the Consumer Expenditure Interview Survey are inflated by a 
factor of 1.5, which is approximately the factor of increase in per capita disposable personal 
income between 1977 and the end of 1972. (The  figure for 1977  is $6,017, and the average of 
1972 and 1973 is $4,061.) 
20.  Details of  how this conversion factor is calculated are available from the author. 
21.  The income elasticity of  food is taken to be 0.51, as estimated by Houtthaker and 
Taylor (1966). The income elasticities of  rental and owner-occupied housing in the upper 
income classes are assumed to be 0.70 and 1, respectively. These numbers are compatible 
with the findings of  Rosen (1978) that the income elasticities of  rental and owned housing 
were both 0.76, given tenure choice, but that the probability of being an owner increased 
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The property tax rate of  0.0154 is calculated by dividing total property 
tax payments in 1975 ($51.49 billion) by total assessed value of property 
in that year ($1,063.9 billion) and applying an estimated percentage of 
assessed value to market value (0.327).22 
The aggregate corporate debt-equity ratio of  0.721 is  calculated  by 
dividing the flow of  funds estimate of  the 1977  value of corporate debt by 
the value of corporate equity ($749.7 billion divided by $1,039.5 billion). 
The payout ratio of  0.544 is found by  dividing dividend payments in 
1977 by corporate profits after inventory valuation and capital consump- 
tion adjustment ($42.1 billion divided by  $77.3 billion). 
The anticipated rate of  inflation is  taken to be 6%, which was the 
average annual increase in the Consumer Price Index between 1975 and 
1977. 
The mismeasurement of  corporate taxable income due to inflation is 
calculated to be $0.00515 of  additional taxable  income  per  dollar of 
corporate capital for each percentage point of  inflation. For example, a 
6% rate of  inflation will cause a $46.35 billion (0.00515 x 6 x 1.5 x 10”) 
overstatement of  corporate profits on a corporate capital stock valued at 
$1.5 trillion. This coefficient was calculated using estimates of  the over- 
statement of  taxable profits taken from Feldstein and Summers (1979) 
and values of  corporate fixed capital and inventories. The desired coef- 
ficient, call it d, should make the equation E = dnK,  correct, where E is 
the profit overstatement, n is the inflation rate, and K, is the value of 
corporate capital. Solving for d,  EInK, comes to 0.00512 for 1977, and as 
an average over the period 1970  to 1977 comes to 0.00519. I therefore use 
0.00515 to represent d for corporate capital as well as food-sector capital 
and rental housing capital. 
Since most government securities are not directly held by households, 
the appropriate value of these stocks in a model with no financial institu- 
tions is problematic. I have chosen values of $100 billion of state and local 
securities, and $200 billion of federal government securities. These values 
are approximately 1.25 times the reported household holdings of  these 
assets in 1977. 
The measure of  risk aversion p is taken to be 3 for all income groups. 
This value was chosen since equilibria calculated using this value yielded 
simulated risk premiums consistent with observed magnitudes and be- 
cause it is compatible with some recent  There  is little empirical 
basis for choosing the variance-covariance  structure of  the assets. For 
these simulations I will assume all covariances to be zero, and the average 
22.  The source for the  property tax payments  and total assessed value  is Facts  and 
Figures  on Government  Finance (Washington: TaxFoundation, 1977). The assessment ratio 
is from the  1972 Census of  Governments. 
23.  A value for p of  3 is comparable to a coefficlent of relative risk aversion of 6.  This is 
consistent  with  the  recent  findings of  Friend  and Hasbrouck  (1980).  although  earlier 
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after-tax variances of the assets to be 0.07 for corporate equity, 0.05 for 
rental housing,  0.12 for food-sector  capital, and 0.02 for tax-exempt 
bonds. Of course the methodology can handle any variance-covariance 
structure, including one with nonzero off-diagonal elements. 
The exponents on capital input in the Cobb-Douglas production func- 
tions are set at 0.207 for the corporate sector and 0.111 for the food- 
related sector. 
12.4.2  The Control Solution 
With this parameterization,  the model is solved for an equilibrium 
solution using a modified Gauss-Seidel algorithm. The equilibrium values 
of  some of the key variables are presented in table 12.1. Note that the 
expected returns given in the table are net of any corporation income and 
property tax payments, but are before personal tax payments. The choice 
of  simple function specifications and realistic parameters makes it im- 
possible to reproduce exactly all the actual 1977 prices and allocations. It 
is  reassuring,  though, that  the model solution yields an allocation of 
factors, production, and relative prices which is close to what the actual 
1977 economy looked like. 
The calculated expected  rates of  return are compatible with actual 
observations. The actual 1977 nominal interest rate on corporate debt 
was 0.080 for Aaa bonds and 0.090 for Baa-rated bonds, compared to the 
model result of  0.104. The difference may be attributed to the model’s 
anticipated inflation rate of  6%, which may be an overestimate of actual 
long-term inflation expectations in that year. The predicted nominal rate 
on tax-exempt bonds is 0.061, compared to Standard and Poor’s yield 
index in 1977  of 0.056, again a slight overestimate. The expected real rate 
of  return to equity that the model calculates in 0.106. That is somewhat 
higher than the average annual rate of return on the Standard and Poor’s 
composite index of  New York Stock Exchange equities over the period 
1926-77, which is 0.081.24  However, 0.106 is substantially higher than the 
realized real rate of return on equities in the decade preceding 1977. All 
in  all, 0.106 seems a not too unreasonable though perhaps optimistic 
reading of  the expected return on equity in 1977. 
The equilibrium solution includes the portfolio holdings of  each in- 
come class. This information is not reproduced in detail here, though 
some characteristics deserve note. As expected, the ownership of equity 
is skewed toward the higher income classes. The top three income classes 
(over $75,000  income), which are presumed to account for 27% of private 
wealth, own 43.9% of the equity. This is consistent with available data on 
dividends received, which indicate that these classes get approximately 
24.  This  calculation  is derived  by  updating  the  average  nominal  rate of  return for 
1926-71 presented in Friend and Blume (1975), and subtracting the average annual increase 
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Table 12.1  Equilibrium Values of Key Variables in Simulated 1977 Economy 
Expected real rate of  return on corporate equity 
Expected real rate of  return on food-sector capital 
Expected real rate of  return on rental housing 
Expected real rate of return on taxable debt 
Corporate capital stock  1,489.8 
Corporate equity  865.6 
Food-sector capital stock  260.0 
Rental housing stock  770.5 





,001  Expected real rate of  return on tax-exempt debt 
Note:  All rates of return are net of  any corporation income tax and property tax payments, 
but are before payment of  any individual income tax liability. 
37% of  all dividends.2s Owner-occupied housing is much less concen- 
trated among the higher income classes, with 79.5% of  the stock owned 
by taxpaying units of  $45,000 or less in income. The ownership of  tax- 
exempt securities is limited to  the top two classes. The lower seven classes 
own positive amounts of  riskless debt, while the top two classes are net 
borrowers of  funds.  In fact, these  highly  taxed  classes  have  a  debt 
position amounting to 26.2% of  their net wealth. 
12.5  An Indexed Tax System-Simulation Results 
12.5.1  With Constant Corporate Financial Policy 
As is well known by now, the United States system of  taxing capital 
income is decidedly nonneutral with respect to inflation. The problem 
arises because in the presence of inflation real capital income is mismea- 
sured. Nominal interest received is treated as income with no deduction 
for the real loss in the value of the principal. Similarly, nominal interest 
payments are fully deductible. Increases in nominal asset value that do 
not correspond to real value increases are subject to the capital gains tax 
if  and when these gains are realized. Also, historical cost depreciation 
rules and certain inventory accounting methods lead to an overestimate 
of  real net earnings.26 
The mismeasurement of  capital income does not uniformly apply to all 
assets. Thus inflation alters the pattern of  real after-tax rates of return 
available. This is turn causes a readjustment of portfolios and a shift in 
the allocation of capital to production sectors, which affects the pretax 
25.  Since the higher income brackets tend to own lower dividend-yielding stocks, 37% of 
dividends received is certainly compatible with owning (at least) 43.9% of  all stock. 
26. As time passes, inflation also pushes taxpayers into higher personal tax brackets, 
increasing both marginal and average tax rates. This dynamic aspect of  an unindexed tax 
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return on assets. The tax penalty (or benefit) from the mismeasurement 
of capital also varies depending on the marginal tax rate of the agents 
involved. Extra corporate  taxable income due  to  inflation is subject to the 
corporation income tax rate, as are the extra deductions of  nominal 
interest payments.  For individuals,  the tax cost varies with  their  tax 
bracket. Thus the overall impact of  inflation depends on the tax-induced 
distortion  of  rates of  return  and agents’  financial  response  to these 
distortions. Clearly a general equilibrium analysis is well suited to this 
type of  problem. 
An indexed tax system would eliminate the distortionary  effects of 
inflation by correctly measuring real capital inc~me.~’  In order to simulate 
the effects of  indexing, the GEFB  model is re-solved for the equilibrium 
that would obtain in the presence of a zero rate of inflation. This effec- 
tively  eliminates  any  mismeasurement  of  capital  income.  Since  the 
equilibrium under an indexed tax system will be identical to the equilib- 
rium under an unindexed tax system which has a zero  rate of inflation, the 
simulation results can be interpreted in either of  two ways. The difference 
between the two equilibria can be seen as either the effect of  an indexed 
tax system or the effect of 6% inflation under an unindexed tax system. 
With no adjustment in tax rates, the total federal tax revenue declines 
as a result of  indexation by $28.2 billion, from $228.3 billion to $199.1 
billion.28  This decrease consists almost entirely of  a $27.8 billion decrease 
in individual income tax liability. The other component is a surprisingly 
small $0.4 billion reduction in corporation income tax paid. This small 
change is the net result of  a few offsetting factors. First, the elimination of 
the excess tax that is due to historical cost depreciation and inventory 
accounting methods outweighs the elimination of the deductibility of the 
inflation premium in nominal interest deductions, amounting to a $3.7 
billion tax saving. The increase in the amount of  corporate capital is 
approximately offset by the decrease in the marginal product of capital. 
What largely offsets the $3.7 billion tax saving is a large decline in the real 
riskless interest rate. The reduced value of interest deductions owing to 
this change causes the corporate tax bill to increase by over $2 billion. 
The combination of these factors yields the small increase in corporate 
income tax liability. 
In order to compare two tax systems with equal total yield, tax rates 
must  be raised  under  indexation. In the results  reported  below,  all 
individual income tax rates were multiplied by an identical factor; brack- 
ets were unchanged as was the corporation income tax rate. This proce- 
dure required a 21.1% increase in all personal tax rates, raising the first 
marginal tax rate to 0.170 and the highest marginal rate to 0.848. This 
27.  The details of an indexing system need not concern us here. 
28.  For this exercise the shortfall in revenue is made up by a levy on individuals that is 
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equal-yield procedure is a crucial element in the simulation results re- 
ported below, since alternative rate adjustments  to make up the lost 
revenue would undoubtedly change the distributional impact of indexing 
and could also affect its allocational implications. 
The equilibrium solution under an  indexed tax  system is partially 
characterized in table 12.2. There is a substantial change in the pattern of 
rates of  return in the economy. First of  all, there is a large decline in the 
real rate of  return on riskless debt, from 0.044 to 0.035. Since inflation in 
an unindexed tax system increases the personal taxation of  debt relative 
to equity, indexation relieves this excess taxation and thereby increases 
the positive demand for riskless debt by the lower-taxed classes, and also 
decreases the desired leverage of  the high income, high-tax-rate classes. 
Since the excess supply of riskless debt by agents other than individuals is 
virtually fixed (government borrows a fixed amount, and corporations 
borrow a fixed proportion of  a slightly changing total capital stock), the 
real rate of  return on riskless debt must fall in order to clear its market. 
The real rate of  return on equity rises from 0.106 to 0.114, indicating that 
the net effect of  indexation is to render equity a relatively less attractive 
investment, requiring a higher rate of  return in equilibrium. That the 
extra tax burden due to inflation is greater for debt than for equity is 
clearly evidenced by the fact that the premium equity earns over debt is 
0.062  without  indexing,  and increases  to 0.079 under indexation  or, 
equivalently, in the absence of  inflation. 
Another striking shift in the pattern of  rates of  return is the sharp 
increase in the equilibrium yield on tax-exempt securities, which earn a 
real rate of  return of  0.0012 in the unindexed inflationary economy but 
whose real return would be 0.0236 in the indexed, or noninflationary, 
equilibrium. The differential  between  the real  return on taxable and 
tax-exempt debt increases from 0.0428 to only 0.0102 in the indexed 
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equilibrium.  The explanation here is quite straightforward. The issuers of 
tax-exempt debt benefit from the mismeasurement and subsequent over- 
taxation of the real return on taxable debt; this enables them to sell debt 
to high-tax-bracket individuals while offering nearly a zero real return. 
When this mismeasurement is eliminated, state and local governments 
must increase their real interest payments by more than 2% in order to 
have their outstanding debt willingly held. 
These changes in  the pattern  of  real returns are accompanied  by 
substantial shifts in the portfolios of  the income groups. Since the tax 
advantages to the highly taxed groups of  equity relative to debt diminish 
under indexing, the concentration of  equity holdings might be expected 
to decline. This does in fact occur, with the proportion of  equity held by 
the top three income  classes falling  from 43.9%  to 37.5%.  Another 
striking change in the portfolios of  the high income groups is the sharp 
decline in the amount of  owner-occupied housing held. Remember, with 
nominal  interest  payments fully deductible from taxable  income,  the 
opportunity cost  of  housing  becomes very  low  under inflation in  an 
unindexed system. Individuals in high tax brackets respond by holding 
large amounts of  owner-occupied housing. Under indexing, even though 
the real rate of interest declines, the opportunity cost of owned housing 
services increases significantly for individuals in high tax brackets.  In 
response, the amount of  wealth put into owner-occupied housing under 
indexing is just 69% of  what it would be under an unindexed system for 
the highest  two income groups. On the other hand, the low income 
groups experience a decline in the cost of owned housing services, since 
the decline  in  the real  interest  rate more than  compensates  for the 
reduced value of interest paid tax deductions. In response, they increase 
the amount that they hold. 
The decline in the high income groups’ holdings of  equity and owner- 
occupied housing is offset primarily by a decline in their indebtedness and 
slightly by increases in their ownership of the other risky assets. As noted 
above, in the unindexed 6% inflation equilibrium, the top two income 
classes borrowed an amount equal to 26.2% of  their net wealth; in the 
equilibrium  under indexing the borrowing  is reduced  to 9.9% of  net 
wealth. 
According to this simulation, the allocational impact of  indexing would 
be minimal,  causing a slight decrease in the amount of  capital in the 
owner-occupied housing, largely at the expense of rental housing. This 
aspect of the simulation results is especially sensitive to the specification 
of the model; in fact, in earlier versions of this model (see Slemrod 1980) 
indexing caused a much larger shift of capital away from owner-occupied 
housing. This earlier result seems  consistent with intuition,  since indexing 
eliminates  the  deductibility  of  nominal  interest  payments  and  thus 
apparently raises the cost of  housing. Although in a model of this com- 447  A General Equilibrium Model 
plexity it is difficult to  trace a result to a particular aspect of the model, the 
absence of such a shift in the present version seems due to the following 
facts. First  of  all,  the substantially lower real  rate of  interest  under 
indexation means that, for the lower-taxed groups who make up the bulk 
of owner-occupied housing demand, the opportunity cost of owned hous- 
ing declines. In fact, a comparison of the two equilibria shows that the five 
lowest income groups find owned housing less expensive in the indexed 
equilibrium; these five groups own about 85% of all owned housing. Thus 
the ownership of  housing shifts from high-income to low-income indi- 
viduals, but the total does not significantly decrease. A second reason is 
the fact that the increased tax rates under indexation tend to lower the 
cost of  owned  housing to all individuals, especially the highly taxed 
groups who experience the greatest absolute tax rate increase. Since this 
increases the value of deducting interest payments from taxable income, 
the effect is to increase the demand for owned housing. 
The welfare effects of  indexing are presented in table 12.3. The num- 
bers in the first column refer to the dollar compensation that must be paid 
before the resolution of the uncertainty in order to make the nonindexed 
inflationary situation indifferent to the indexed situation. The usual index 
number problem applies here, since the value of the required compensa- 
tion depends on whether it is to be paid (or received) in the preindexing 
or postindexing situation. The values presented in table  12.3 are the 
simple average of  these two compensation figures. 
The simulation results indicate that a system of  indexation, with lost 
revenue made up by adjusting all personal tax rates upward by a multi- 
plicative factor, would cause an increase in welfare for the highest five 
income groups and a decrease in welfare for the lowest four income 
groups, with the dividing income level being approximately $30,000 in 
annual income. Without an explicit social welfare function to balance the 
Table 12.3  Simulated Welfare Effects Due to Indexing 
Welfare  Welfare Change as 
Income Class  Change  a Percentage of 
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gains and losses, it is impossible to say whether this would be a desirable 
change to make. However, the sum of the compensation values is clearly 
positive ($6.4 billion, or about one-half of  1% of  national income ad- 
justed for the disutility of  risk), indicating that a compensation system 
could be arranged so that indexation would be a Pareto-optimal improve- 
ment. In that sense, indexation would reduce the distortionary cost of the 
tax system. Note that this result does not consider any dynamic efficiency 
effects of  indexation. 
There are several aspects to this increase in efficiency. First, there is a 
small efficiency gain from the slight shift of  capital away from owner- 
occupied housing, which is oversupplied because of the tax advantages it 
receives even in the absence of  inflation. Second, indexation tends to 
reduce the dispersion in the cost of  owner-occupied housing and thus 
reduces the inefficiency that  results from  individuals facing different 
prices for the same good. In the unindexed inflationary economy, the 
total cost of  owner-occupied housing ranged from $0.094 per unit of 
housing service (where one unit of  service is produced by  one unit of 
capital) for the lowest income group to $0.029 for the highest taxed 
group. In the indexed equilibrium, the range of prices is $0.085 to $0.047. 
Thus the owner-occupied housing stock is more efficiently distributed 
under indexation, as there is less incentive for the high income groups to 
borrow in order to hold housing. 
A third source of  the efficiency gain under indexation is the improved 
allocation of risk-bearing. Since after-tax risk premiums are not the same 
for all individuals, risk is not borne optimally. Inflation in an unindexed 
system exacerbates this problem since it widens the dispersion of  risk 
premiums because of its differential impact on risky and riskless assets. 
Thus, under indexing, this dispersion is reduced and risk is borne more 
efficiently. 
The pattern of  the distributional impact of  inflation also has several 
sources. First, indexation tends to reduce the total taxation of  capital 
income. In order to make up the lost revenue, all personal tax rates were 
increased. Since labor income constitutes the bulk of  personal taxable 
income, the indexing scheme is accompanied by a not insignificant shift in 
the tax burden from the high income classes to the low income classes, 
who have a much higher relative endowment of labor versus capital. Thus 
the lowest four income classes, the ones who apparently suffer under 
indexation, find their federal tax burden increased by $6.44 billion under 
the indexed system, or an increase of  8.8% 
The highest two income classes of  course face the highest increase in 
tax rates under the general tax increase scheme, but their reduced taxable 
income under indexation almost entirely cancels out this effect so that in 
the end they pay only $0.93 billion more in federal taxes, just 3.1% of 
their initial tax payments. However, it is important to keep in mind that 449  A General Equilibrium Model 
t4e increased tax rates also serve to reduce the after-tax variance of their 
risky capital investments. This plus the fact that under indexation these 
two classes hold a much less levered portfolio implies that the disutility 
from risky income is substantially lower in their optimal portfolios under 
indexation. These individuals also substitute income-earning assets for a 
large chunk of  their  owner-occupied  housing,  the marginal  utility  of 
which was very low. Finally, the top two classes benefit greatly from the 
increased real return earned by  tax-exempt  securities, which are held 
almost exclusively by these individuals. The increase in their real yield 
from 0.001 to  0.025 provides a transfer of approximately $2.4 billion from 
the general public to these two classes. 
At this point it is important to alert the reader that the results of  these 
simulations are meant to be illustrative of the kind of analysis this kind of 
model can provide. The results are not seen as the final word on the 
effects of  indexation on the United States economy, owing to our lack of 
knowledge about certain of  the parameters and functional forms of  the 
model, and also to the sensitivity of  the results to certain aspects of  the 
model itself. For example, sensitivity analysis not reported here indicates 
that the allocational impact of  indexation is sensitive to the modeling of 
the housing sector and the distributional implications depend on the kind 
of  equal-yield tax adjustment that is assumed to be used as well as the 
relation of  the after-tax variance of  assets to the marginal tax rate. This 
model has a multitude of dimensions to which sensitivity analysis could 
conceivably be applied. This warning is meant to serve as a less cumber- 
some substitute to reporting these results. 
12.5.2  With Responsive Corporate Financial Policy 
Now the simulation of  an indexed tax system is repeated, this time 
allowing corporations to adjust their financial policy in response to the 
changing tax environment. An earlier section discussed the methodology 
to be used in calculating the corporate behavioral response. Note that the 
optimal financial policy on which this methodology is based is indepen- 
dent of  the rate of  inflation and is therefore unaffected by indexing.2y 
Nevertheless, although the indexing (or inflation) itself does not matter, 
29.  King  (1978).  pp.  111-12,  shows that,  in  models  with one type  of  investor, no 
bankruptcy costs, and no constraints on individual portfolios, the conditions determining 
whether a firm should prefer debt or equity are unaffected by the rate of inflation. However, 
this formulation is not compatible with the existence of  an optimal debt-equity ratio, either 
for the firm or for the economy as a whole. In models of capital market equilibrium which 
feature optimal nonextreme financial policies, the rate of inflation may have a direct impact 
on the  equilibrium  financial  structure of  the  firm  and/or economy.  (See for instance 
Auerbach and King 1980 and Gordon 1980). However, at the moment there is no econ- 
ometric evidence on the relation  between  inflation  and financial structure that  can  be 
invoked in this simulation model, and explicitly modeling the conditions which lead to an 
interior equilibrium, such as constraints on borrowing or the existence of  bankruptcy costs, 
is beyond the scope of  this present study. 450  Joel Slernrod 
certain changes in the economy caused by the indexation scheme may 
cause  corporations  to alter  their  financial decisions.  Changes in  the 
ownership of  equity by  income class will alter the tax cost of  a given 
financial policy; indexation tends to reduce the concentration of  equity 
ownership among the higher income classes, and thus reduce the tax 
advantage of debt and retentions. Other relevant factors are any changes 
in the marginal tax rates on dividends, debt interest, and capital gains. 
These changes may result either from changes in the taxable income of 
the individuals or from  changes in  the  tax  rate  schedule  needed  to 
keep total tax revenues unchanged. The net effect of  these influences 
will determine the direction and magnitude of  the corporate financial 
response. 
The simulation results indicate that there would be very little adjust- 
ment in corporate financial policy. The ownership of equity shifts toward 
individuals with lower marginal tax rates, but the upward adjustment of 
all tax rates to maintain equal yield offsets that to a large extent. In the 
indexed equilibrium, the aggregate corporate debt-capital ratio falls from 
0.419 to 0.378 and the payout ratio does not change at all. 
The equilibrium looks very similar to that which is depicted in table 
12.2. The only significant difference is that the real rate of  return on 
equity is 0.108 instead of 0.114. This difference is due to the fact that with 
a reduced debt-equity ratio equity shares are less risky and therefore earn 
a lower risk premium in equilibrium. 
The distributional implications of  indexing are also not substantially 
changed by allowing corporations financial flexibility. The shift toward 
equity and away from debt would be expected to benefit the higher-taxed 
individuals, for whom the retention of earnings at the corporate level has 
a sheltering effect, at the expense of the lower-taxed individuals. This is 
exactly the pattern that the simulation results reveal. The top two income 
classes benefit even more from indexing than table 12.3  indicates, and the 
lower seven classes fare slightly less well than that table suggests. In all 
cases, since the corporate financial adjustment is not large, the difference 
in results is not great; for that reason the detailed results are not pre- 
sented here. 
12.6  Concluding Remarks 
This research demonstrates the feasibility of  integrating a structural 
treatment of  portfolio choice and financial markets with the standard 
multisector general equilibrium model of taxation. The model developed 
here takes account of  the unsurprising fact that when there are changes in 
the taxation of  capital income, individuals will  adjust their  financial 
behavior in response. A correct understanding of  the effects of  a tax 
change, including its implications for total tax revenue, the allocation of 451  A General Equilibrium Model 
production, and the distributional impact, requires consideration of  the 
general equilibrium impact of  this financial behavioral response. 
The model is used to simulate the impact of a completely indexed tax 
system. Owing to uncertainty about the values of  several parameters and 
the relatively simple formulations of  the determinants  of  portfolio choice 
and the United States financial structure, the simulation results should 
not be regarded as disposing of  the policy questions involved. Neverthe- 
less, the simulation results point  to significant financial adjustment in 
response to indexation or, conversely, to inflation in an unindexed econ- 
omy. A significant shifting of the location of  private risk bearing accom- 
panies a slight reallocation of the capital stock away from owner-occupied 
housing toward its other uses and a substantial change in the ownership of 
this stock by  income class.  All  in  all, indexing the tax system of  an 
economy like the United States in 1977 seems to lead to an efficiency 
gain, slightly hurts the lowest income classes, and substantially improves 
the welfare of  the highest income groups. 
Further research is needed for a more complete understanding of  the 
relation between taxation on the one hand and financial behavior and 
markets on the other hand. The role and behavior of  financial institutions 
should be integrated  into the modeling of individuals’ behavior presented 
here.3o  The dynamic implications of  introducing financial behavior into 
tax models is also a promising topic for future investigation. 
Appendix 
Table 12.A.1  Endowment of  Capital and Labor by Income Class, 1977 
Income Class 
(x  $1,000)  Capital (billions)  Labor (billions) 
0-9  440.3  140.2 
9-15  405.8  186.7 
15-22.5  572.0  259.6 
22.5-30  611.4  187.0 
30-45  615.7  111.7 
45-75  447.0  63.1 
75-150  517.3  35.5 
150-300  463.7  11.4 
More than 300  162.7  6.2 
Total  4,238.5  1,001.4 
30.  A first step toward a model with financial institutions is made in Slemrod (1980, pp. 
165-204). 452  Joel Slemrod 
Table 12.A.2  Shares of  Spending on Food, Rental Housing, and Owned Housing 
~~~~  ~~ 
Income Class  Rental  Owned 
(x  $l,OOo)  Food  Housing  Housing 
0-9  .206  ,152  ,070 
9-15  .176  ,114  ,059 
15-22.5  ,167  ,070  .081 
22.5-30  .159  ,044  .095 
3w5  ,145  ,028  ,091 
45-75  ,128  ,023  ,085 
75-150  ,101  .020  ,085 
150-300  ,076  ,018  ,085 
More than 300  ,058  ,016  .085 
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Comment  Peter Mieszkowski 
In this paper and in the longer version of  his work (1980), Joel Slemrod 
has made a very  significant  contribution to our understanding  of  the 
taxation of  capital income and the effects of inflation in a unindexed tax 
system. 
The work is notable in a number of  respects. Slemrod integrates a 
structural model of  portfolio choice and financial markets with the mul- 
tisector general equilibrium model of  taxation developed by Harberger 
and Shoven-Whalley.  Nine income groups are recognized,  and asset 
demand equations for corporate equity, taxable and nontaxable debt, 
rental and owner-occupied housing are specified. The different income 
groups face different tax rates, and they hold different portfolios. High- 
income groups hold most of  the tax-exempt (municipal) debt and a large 
portion of  corporate equity. Some of  the most interesting results of the 
paper relate to the varying impact of  tax policy changes on different 
income groups. For example, Slemrod concludes that a decrease in the 
rate of  inflation  or the indexation of  the tax system for inflation will 
increase the cost of  housing to high-income groups and decrease its cost 
to low-income groups. 
The asset demand equations are quite general and account for changes 
in the tax-induced changes in risk (variance of return) as well as changes 
in after-tax rates of  return. All rates of  return are endogenous, and the 
analysis allows for changes in corporate financial policy. The analysis is 
comparative statics. The overall stocks of wealth and labor are taken as 
given, and changes in equilibrium stocks of  capital in various industries 
and changes in the rates of return on various investments are calculated 
by means of simulation techniques. The long-run equilibrium nature of 
the analysis should be kept in mind in relating Slemrod’s results to  other 
work on the effects of  inflation which emphasizes changes in inflationary 
expectations. 
Slemrod has performed two simulation experiments.  One is on the 
effects of  integrating the corporate and personal  income  taxes.  The 
second experiment, which is reported in this paper, is on the effects of 
indexing the existing tax system for inflation. This is equivalent to analyz- 
ing the change resulting from changes in the rate of  inflation in a tax 
system that is not indexed, and we shall adopt this interpretation. 
Before turning to the specific results, let us take note of the following, 
which should be very helpful to the understanding of  most of the results. 
Suppose  that in the absence  of inflation the nominal and real before-tax 
rate of  return on taxable debt is 6%. Taxpayers in the 50% marginal rate 
bracket will earn a 3% rate after taxes. If the expected rate of  inflation 
Peter  Mieszkowski  is  with the  Department  of  Economics, Rice  University,  and the 
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increases to 10% and the nominal rate increases to 16%, the real yield 
for households in low tax brackets (say zero) remains unchanged at 6% 
while  for  taxpayers  in  the  50%  bracket  the  real  after-tax  yield  is 
This example has a number of  more general implications.  (1) It is 
possible  for the real before-tax  yield  on debt to rise  as the result  of 
inflation but for the after-tax real yield to  decrease (become negative) for 
high income groups. This implies changes in the composition of  portfolios 
for different income groups as the result of  inflation. (2) Inflation makes 
taxable debt a less (more) attractive asset for high (low) income groups. 
The real yield on nontaxable municipal deSt will fall as will the return on 
equity. (3) As inflation  may  make the real  after-tax yield  on bonds 
negative to  high income groups, these groups will find it very profitable to 
borrow under inflationary conditions as they deduct nominal interest. 
Investment in  housing and other durables will  be profitable for high 
income groups. 
I present these results as if they are self-evident, but they are clear only 
as the result of  Slemrod’s work. 
In his analysis the move to an indexed tax system is equivalent to 
moving  from a  6% rate of  inflation  to a zero rate of  inflation.  The 
principal result is that the before-tax real rate of  return on taxable debt 
decreases  significantly as taxes are imposed on real, rather than nominal, 
interest. Also, as a result of  indexation high income groups find taxable 
debt a more attractive investment, and the returns to equity and tax- 
exempt municipals must rise to maintain portfolio balance. Thus Slem- 
rod’s long-run equilibrium model does not provide indirect evidence for 
the view that the low level of  stock prices during the recent inflationary 
experience  can be explained by tax considerations. It illustrates how state 
and local governments can benefit from inflation at the expense of  high 
income groups that hold the tax-exempt debt. 
Another result is that indexation of the tax system leads to a decrease in 
the demand for owner-occupied housing and an increase in rental hous- 
ing. This confirms the familiar point that inflation increases the demand 
for owner-occupied housing as nominal mortgage payments are deducted 
under the income tax. But the adjustment in the aggregate is quite small. 
The owner-occupied  housing  stock falls by  only 3%  as the result  of 
indexation. 
But the small change in the aggregate is apparently the net result of two 
offsetting tendencies. Inflation without indexation reduces the real bor- 
rowing rates for the wealthy and significantly increases the borrowing of 
high income groups to hold equity and owner-occupied housing. On  the 
other hand inflation also increases the real before-tax borrowing rate for 
lower and moderate income groups, who are less likely to itemize and 
16(  1 -  t,,) -  10: -  2%. 457  A General Equilibrium Model 
whose marginal tax rate is relatively low. So we have the interesting result 
that indexation, by decreasing the before-tax borrowing rate, decreases 
the cost of owner-occupied housing to  lower income groups  and increases 
the cost of  housing to the rich. 
A related point that is presented in Slemrod’s thesis is that inflation, by 
decreasing the cost of  rental housing relative to corporate goods, may 
make low income groups better off, at least with respect to this consump- 
tion effect. 
The main result of  the indexation experiment is that indexation will 
decrease the welfare of  households whose income is less than $30,000 a 
year and increase the welfare of  the wealthy. The welfare change as a 
percentage of  preindexed income for the two wealthiest groups is very 
large. 
There are a number of  aspects to the change in the distribution of real 
income. These include the efficiency gains of  indexation, the increase in 
the return to equity and tax-exempt debt. The main effect is the decrease 
in the overall rate of  taxation on capital income and the increase in wage 
taxation to maintain budget  balance.  Slemrod calculates that with  no 
adjustment in tax rates total federal tax revenues decline by about 12%  as 
the result of indexation. This increase is due almost entirely to  a decrease 
in  individual tax liability,  implying that the tax saving correcting for 
historical cost depreciation and inventory accounting methods is largely 
offset by the lower deductions for lower nominal interest. 
These results are in rough accordance with earlier work (see Feldstein 
and Summers 1979). But unfortunately  they  are not  consistent with 
Slemrod’s earlier results presented in his dissertation (1980) that indexa- 
tion would actually  increase federal revenues, since indexation would 
significantly decrease the borrowing of the wealthy and since the decrease 
in the deduction of interest would increase tax collections. 
Obviously the reader should rely on the latest version of the model, 
which  is  calibrated for a more recent  year.  But without knowing  the 
details it is difficult not to be skeptical, given the wide range of  results, 
about the accuracy of the model’s predictions. 
It is certainly not my intention to end on a sour note. Slemrod has done 
a great deal to integrate the financial and real sides of tax analysis. 
He has assembled  the empirical  facts with  care,  and  the work  is 
sufficiently general that virtually every partial story that has been told 
about the effects of inflation on resource allocation and effective taxation 
can be fitted into his framework. The real contribution of his work is that 
most of the issues involved are much more transparent from a qualitative 
standpoint. The quantitative ambiguities need to be investigated further, 
but they are minor detractions  from Joel Slemrod’s overall contribution. 458  Joel Slemrod 
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